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This article argues that the introduction of section 30A into the CDPA, covering fair 
dealing for the purposes of caricature, parody or pastiche, is far more significant than 
appreciated thus far due to the far-reaching scope of the pastiche limb of the 
exception. It argues that pastiche is not a variant of parody, instead referring to a 
range of imitative conduct, notably imitation of the style of pre-existing works, 
incorporation of elements or features of those works, and the production of 
compilations and medleys. As such, section 30A can extend to mash-ups, fan fiction, 
music sampling, collage, appropriation art and other forms of homage and 
compilation, albeit within the infrastructure of a fair dealing. To make out these 
claims, it analyses the ordinary meaning of the term pastiche, its interpretation as a 
copyright concept, and the interpretative cues to come from the Court of Justice 
decision in Deckmyn v Vandersteen. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“To write a discourse history of the terms ‘pasticcio’ and ‘pastiche’ is nothing short 
of adventurous.”1 
In October 2014, new copyright exceptions came into force in the UK, including 
section 30A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 covering fair dealing for 
the purposes of caricature, parody or pastiche. These reforms were the culmination of 
a lengthy campaign for the introduction of new exceptions into the CDPA, including 
in relation to parody. 2  The UK drafters of section 30A took the language of 
“caricature, parody or pastiche” from Article 5(3)(k) of the Information Society 
Directive, 3  placing that text in the context of the UK’s existing fair dealing 
machinery. Significantly, whilst much attention has been directed to the meaning of 
parody and justifications for a parody exception,4 there has been far less analysis of its 
legislative bunkmate, pastiche. This raises the question of what additional work, if 
any, is done by the inclusion of this word in section 30A: is “pastiche” merely a 
synonym for “parody” or does it refer to imitation of a different type? 
This article will argue that despite variation in the use of the word “pastiche” in 
different artistic fields, there is consensus that it refers to laudatory and non-critical 
imitation, such as creating a new work in the style of another artist or genre, and 
making a new work from a compilation or assembly of pre-existing works. Pastiche 
therefore includes “anti-twist” uses, ie, those where there is no attempt to ridicule, 
lampoon or satirise that work, or comment critically on that work or other themes. 
                                                 
1  Ingeborg Hoesterey, Pastiche: Cultural Memory in Art, Film and Literature (Indiana 
University Press 2001) 1. 
2 Eg, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (HM Treasury 2006), Recommendation 12; Ian 
Hargreaves, Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth (May 2011) 
51. For a discussion of this process, see Sir Robin Jacob, “Parody and IP claims: a defence? – 
a right to parody?” in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Jane C Ginsburg (eds), Intellectual 
Property at the Edge: The Contested Contours of IP (CUP 2014). 
3 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. 
4 Eg, Richard Posner, “When is Parody Fair Use?” (1992) 21 J Legal Stud 67; Robert P. 
Merges, “Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in 
Copyright” (1993) 21 AIPLA QJ 305; Sherri L Burr, “Artistic Parody: A Theoretical 
Construct” (1996) 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 65; Michael Spence, “Intellectual Property and 
the Problem of Parody” (1998) 114 LQR 594; David J Brennan, “Copyright and Parody in 
Australia: Some Thoughts on Suntrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin Company” (2002) 13 AIPJ 
161; Ronan Deazley, “Copyright and Parody: Taking Backward the Gowers Review?” (2010) 
73 MLR 785; Jonathan Griffiths, “Fair Dealing after Deckmyn – the United Kingdom’s 
Defence for Caricature, Parody or Pastiche’ in Megan Richardson and Sam Ricketson (eds), 
Research Handbook on Intellectual Property in Media and Entertainment (Edward Elgar 
2017).  
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This can be contrasted with the “expectation-defying alterations” 5 of parody and the 
exaggeration of caricature.6 This raises serious doubts about assertions that the three 
terms are “too similar for it to be possible to distinguish between them.”7 
That said, any analysis of the meaning of pastiche must be undertaken in light of 
principles of statutory interpretation and of judicial interpretative practices, which 
demonstrate that copyright understandings of statutory language may depart from 
ordinary meanings.8 This article will pay particular attention to the judgment of the 
CJEU in Deckmyn v Vandersteen.9 That judgment included a number of observations 
regarding the legal interpretations of the term parody under Article 5(3)(k), including 
that parody is an autonomous European concept and that courts must undertake a 
human rights balancing exercise when applying the parody exception. Logic dictates 
that these factors would apply equally to the other elements of Article 5(3)(k), making 
it necessary to consider whether, and how, they might impact on the ambit of the 
pastiche defence. 
The key message of this article is that the introduction of section 30A into the CDPA 
is far more significant than has been appreciated thus far,10 as the term pastiche can 
clearly extend to mash-ups, fan fiction, music sampling, appropriation art and other 
forms of homage and compilation. To illustrate, the defendant’s artworks in the US 
case of Cariou v Prince,11  understood as examples of transformative use by the 
Second Circuit, could reasonably be classified as instances of pastiche in the UK. 
Whether they would also constitute a fair dealing is another matter – and here we will 
                                                 
5 Brennan (n 4) 166. 
6  For an analysis of the meaning of caricature, albeit not in the copyright context, see 
Attorney-General v Trustees of the Art Gallery of NSW (1944) 62 WN (NSW) 212 (eligibility 
of a painting that exaggerated and distorted the features of the sitter to win the Archibald 
Prize for portraiture). 
7 Description of the oral argument of Belgium by Advocate General Villalón in Deckmyn v 
Vandersteen (C-201/13) ECR I-0000 at [42]; see, also, the French approach to caricature, 
parody and pastiche described below n 62 to n 70 and surrounding text. As noted by Griffiths 
(n 4), the Advocate General’s own statements on this question (at [46] of his opinion) are 
unclear, and could be understood to suggest that the three categories are distinct but overlap 
or, alternatively, that the three concepts “cannot usefully be disaggregated”. This matter was 
note dealt with by the Grand Chamber. 
8 See Graeme W Austin, “EU and US Perspectives on Fair Dealing for the Purpose of Parody 
or Satire” (2016) 39 UNSWLJ 684, especially 684-685. 
9 Deckmyn v Vandersteen (C-201/13) [2014] ECDR 21 (Grand Chamber). 
10 For instance, in her analysis of the status of remixes and sampling after the 2014 copyright 
reforms, Sabine Jacques uses the word “pastiche” only once, instead focusing her fair dealing 
analysis on the quotation and parody, with the latter said to require humour (which she says 
could be defined broadly to include unexpected, playful or rule-breaking combinations): 
Sabine Jacques, “Mash-ups and mixes: what impact have the recent copyright reforms had on 
the legality of sampling?” (2016) 27 Ent LR 3, 5-7.  
11 Cariou v Prince, 784 F Supp 2d 337 (SDNY 2011); 714 F 3d 694 (2nd circuit, 2013). 
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need to consider normative questions regarding the circumstances in which pastiche 
ought to be permitted under a free exception. This point is significant as it indicates 
why we can be sanguine about giving pastiche a robust, standalone definition: in the 
UK, much intellectual heavy lifting can be done by the fairness factors; and indeed 
elsewhere in Europe, such considerations can inform the human rights balancing 
exercise required by the Court of Justice when applying Article 5(3)(k). 
This article commences by providing an overview of the artistic meanings of pastiche, 
emphasising its relevance to anti-twist uses. In Section III the analysis turns to 
pastiche as a copyright concept, focusing in particular on the extent (if at all) that the 
term’s legal definition departs from ordinary usage. This includes consideration of the 
history of pastiche in French and European law, and the interpretative lessons that can 
be drawn from Deckmyn. Section IV draws this analysis together by urging a liberal 
understanding of  pastiche in copyright law. It resists any suggestion that caricature, 
parody and pastiche are functionally equivalent, arguing that whilst there may be 
overlaps in their coverage, the technical meanings of pastiche takes it far outside the 
realms of parody and caricature. It argues further that pastiche should not be narrowed 
by arguments said to derive from Deckmyn; on the contrary, there are strong 
normative arguments in favour of liberal exceptions, and aspects of Deckmyn (notably 
its emphasis on freedom of speech) are consistent with a broad definition of pastiche 
in copyright law. 
II. WHAT IS PASTICHE? 
In order to develop the propositions in this article, it is necessary to start with an 
examination of pastiche as a non-legal concept. Compared with parody and caricature, 
the term pastiche is used less frequently in the English language. For instance, the 
Oxford English Dictionary places parody and caricature in Frequency Band 5, whilst 
pastiche is in the less well-utilised Band 4.12 Similarly, a Google Books Ngram search 
of pastiche, parody and caricature13 suggests that it was not until the 1920s that use of 
                                                 
12  See Oxford English Dictionary (OUP online version 2016). The Bands are based on 
frequency of usage, based primarily on Google Books Ngrams data, and run from Band 1 
(least common) to Band 8 (most common). Words in Band 5 (used “between 1 and 10 times 
per million words in typical modern English usage”) are therefore more frequent than Band 4 
(used “between 0.1 and 1.0 times”), although neither are everyday words and are associated 
with “educated discourse” (Band 5) and “much greater specificity” (Band 4). See 
http://public.oed.com/how-to-use-the-oed/key-to-frequency/.  
13 The Google Books Ngram Viewer, available at https://books.google.com/ngrams, allows 
searches across the books digitised by Google as part of the Google Books Project. In this 
instance, the relevant search was for the words “pastiche”, “caricature” and “parody” (case 
insensitive) from 1700 to 2008 from the corpus of English books. Care must be taken in the 
interpretation of this data, for instance due to large numbers of scientific texts that can skew 
results, mistakes in OCR versions, and so forth. However, the Ngram search is used here for a 
more limited claim about the respective frequency of parody, caricature and pastiche. 
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the word pastiche began to trend upwards from a baseline of negligible (and often 
zero) use. In contrast, the words parody and caricature enjoyed far greater usage from 
1700 to 2008, with caricature used more frequently than parody from 1812 to 1965, 
and parody overtaking caricature from that point. Looking at the 2008 dataset, parody 
was used over five times more often than pastiche, and around 1.5 times more often 
than caricature. This may help explain the impression (obviously anecdotal) that 
pastiche is less accessible to potential users as a fair dealing purpose because of lack 
of familiarity with its non-legal meaning. Against such a background, it may be easy 
to assume that, because it appears alongside parody and caricature, pastiche must be 
synonymous with or a close variant of these acts. 
An indication that pastiche describes quite different forms of endeavour comes from 
the definition in the OED. The entry for pastiche as a noun reads: 
1. a. A novel, poem, painting, etc., incorporating several different styles, or made 
up of parts drawn from a variety of sources. b. A musical composition 
incorporating different styles; a medley. 
2. a. A work, esp. of literature, created in the style of someone or something else; 
a work that humorously exaggerates or parodies a particular style. b. The 
technique of incorporating distinctive elements of other works or styles in a 
literary composition, design, etc. 
The definitions in paragraph 1 are cross-referenced to elements of the entry for 
“pasticcio”, a term of Italian origin covering similar ground in relation to mixing and 
imitation, and used regularly in discussions of pastiche: 
1. a. Music. An opera or other work consisting of a medley of pieces from 
different compositions or by different composers. b. A work of art or architecture 
imitating an antique or older style; esp. one incorporating elements taken or 
copied from antique or classical works; this style in art or architecture. …14 
The definitions in the OED accord with descriptions in specialist texts, although the 
former do not capture the nuance that comes from a detailed examination of the 
history and meaning of pastiche (and pasticcio) in the visual arts, literature and music. 
It is not possible to attempt such a project here, but some key ideas about pastiche as a 
technical term can be noted. It is clear that pastiche has a dual identity, referring to 
both a “combination of aesthetic elements” and “a kind of aesthetic imitation”,15 
                                                 
14 The OED (n 12) places pasticcio in Frequency Band 3 for words that “occur between 0.01 
and 0.1 times per million words in typical modern English usage”. Such words are “not 
commonly found in general text types” but “are not overly opaque or obscure”. 
15 Richard Dyer, Pastiche (Routledge 2007) 1. 
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giving the term a “slippery quality”.16 Its use in the artistic context can be traced back 
to sixteenth century Italy, and in particular the “pasticcio” painting: “eclectically 
blended” works that combined themes and motifs from Renaissance art sources.17 The 
resulting works exhibited a “sort of generic High Renaissance style”, although they 
were also viewed dimly because of their composition and, in many cases, fraudulent 
presentation as authentic works.18 It seems that the concept of pasticcio emerged in 
France some time in the seventeenth century under the name pastiche, although the 
historical narrative is incomplete.19 The genre then continued to evolve, for instance 
through greater recognition of the ingenuity and lineage of artistic imitation, and 
through the term’s use for literary composition.20 
In musical realms, it has been said that the pasticcio operas of the eighteen century 
also represented “a new positive value” of the genre of pastiche.21 These productions 
typically involved the performance of a series of popular arias from different 
composers, often held together with a tenuous plot. The pasticcio format was 
attractive for a number of reasons. For the travelling opera group with a limited 
catalogue of works, remixing permitted novel productions. The pasticcio offered an 
opportunity for repeat listening in an age without sound recordings, and shared 
parallels with the “suitcase” aria: the phenomenon of star singers inserting their own 
favourite songs into any production. It has also been observed that for composers, 
writing music was often “like crafting a piece of handmade furniture, far-removed 
from the Romantic notion of creating an original masterpiece.”22 Their purpose, it is 
said, was often “functional”: to create something “in circulation for a few weeks or 
months, before being relegated to the archives in favour of something more 
current.”23 This meant there was not the same sort of moral or commercial concern 
with copying; as one opera blogger jokingly notes, “[p]art laxity with copyright, part 
                                                 
16 Hoesterey (n 1) 9. 
17 The term “pasticcio” is also Italian for pie, and this mixing of artistic elements was akin to 
the combination of ingredients in such a dish: Dyer (n 15) 8-9. 
18 Hoesterey (n 1) 1-4.  
19 Ibid., 4-5. 
20 Ibid., 5-7. To illustrate, John Fowles’s novel The French Lieutenant’s Woman has been 
described as a “well-known modern example” of the genre, being “partly a pastiche of the 
great Victorian novelists”: Chris Baldick, Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms (OUP online 
version 2015). 
21 Hoesterey (n 1) 8. 
22  Julian Perkins, “Musical Pies: An Introduction to the Pasticcio” (April 2015), 
http://julianperkins.com/julians-jottings/programme-notes/musical-pies.html.   
23 Ibid. 
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free advertising, them 18th century folk had different ideas about intellectual 
property.”24 Another explains: 
“Pastiche” carries negative connotations now, but didn’t in baroque times when 
recycling was part of what went into theatre. Recordings didn’t exist then, so 
composers were expected to re-use popular melodies so people could enjoy them 
again. That’s also partly why baroque operas adapt similar ideas over and over. 
Audiences delighted in new ways of hearing old. How many of Vivaldi’s operas 
were all “new” or even all Vivaldi? And how many adaptations of Ariosto and 
Tasso? The baroque aesthetic blended characters from ancient antiquity and 
medieval myth in joyous riot. Even Mozart had no qualms about recycling a 
good tune. So snobbery about this kind of pastiche is misguided.25 
As indicated in this quote, the pasticcio opera was not confined to small-fry or 
amateur productions, and a number of leading composers embraced the format.26 
During the nineteenth century, pasticcio fell out of fashion for being gauche and 
lacking the musical integrity and genius of the original.27 Despite this, pasticcio has 
remained a part of operatic composition, and there are contemporary examples.28 
Against this backdrop, musicologists draw a distinction between pastiche and 
pasticcio, with the former referring to works that deliberately imitate the style of 
another, and pasticcio to operas and other performances drawing from the works of 
different composers. 29  It is clear, however, that different iterations of anti-twist 
                                                 
24 opera, innit?, “Half baked thoughts on pasticcio (should opera be *gasp* tasty?)”, 15 March 
2015, https://dehggial.wordpress.com/2015/03/15/pasticcio-baroque-opera/.  
25 Classical Iconoclast, “The Enchanted Island at the Met – deeper than expected”, 23 January 
2012, http://classical-iconoclast.blogspot.co.uk/2012/01/enchanted-island-at-met-deeper-
than.html.  
26 Handel stands out in this regard: for a comprehensive history, see Donald Burrows, The 
Master Musicians: Handel (OUP 2nd ed, 2012). 
27 This is illustrated by the entry for “pasticcio” in the 1880 edition of Grove’s, which said 
that despite its prominence in the eighteenth century and its utilisation by master composers, 
the style “never inspired any real respect, even in its brightest days”. Like the pastiche in the 
world of painting, it appears one issue was the fraudulent manner in which some pasticcios 
were presented, including the lack of proper attribution of the music to the relevant composer. 
The aesthetic merit of the production was also questioned, given the perceived lack of unity 
between the individual selections. See George Grove (ed), A Dictionary of Music and 
Musicians, Vol II (Macmillan, 1880) 668-670. 
28 Eg, The Enchanted Island, written by Jeremy Sams and premiering at the Metropolitan 
Opera, New York, on 31 December 2011. For a description of the creative process, see 
Jeremy Sams, “The Enchanted Island: the isle is full of mash-ups”, The Guardian, 10 January 
2012, https://www.theguardian.com/music/2012/jan/10/enchanted-island-met-opera-baroque.  
29 Alison Latham, Oxford Companion to Music (OUP online version 2011); Tim Rutherford-
Johnson, Michael Kennedy and Joyce Bourne Kennedy (eds), Oxford Dictionary of Music 
(OUP online version 2016) (although pastiche “has a meaning as ‘medley’, it is invariably 
applied musically in the sense outlined above [ie, composition in the style of another]”). 
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imitation – eg, blending different musical influences or styles, and sampling from 
existing works – remain extremely common in modern musical composition, 30 
although the latter is more significant legally because it is far more likely to involve 
the reproduction of a protected element of a copyright work. 
Developing a definition of pastiche is challenging because of the variation in the 
meaning of the term in different creative circles, and its continued evolution over 
time. As Richard Dyer observes, “the word pastiche is in practice extremely elastic”, 
which can result in “generally fruitless discussion about whether such and such really 
is pastiche.”31 Dyer’s thesis – which focuses on pastiche as aesthetic imitation rather 
than pastiche (or in his language, pasticcio) as a combination of existing elements – 
adopts a preliminary definition of pastiche as “a kind of imitation that you are meant 
to know is an imitation.”32 As Dyer notes, this generates questions about creator 
intention, audience knowledge, and the indications and markers of pastiche.33 Dyer 
seeks to challenge the pejorative connotations that surround pastiche, arguing that 
“pastiche can now just mean, and I wish it did just mean, evident recombination and 
imitation of prior works, but the negative associations persist, mainly now in terms of 
triviality and pointlessness.” 34  Ingeborg Hoesterey also counters the “vaguely 
traditional, predominantly negative” 35  interpretation given to pastiche, pressing a 
postmodern vision of the genre as “about cultural memory and the merging of 
horizons past and present” – practices that “borrow ostentatiously from the archive of 
Western culture”, and that seek to “[foster] critical thinking.”36 She argues that having 
“for centuries [been] on the fringe of aesthetic canons … [m]etamorphoses of 
[pastiche] can be found today in architecture, painting, sculpture/assemblage, in film 
                                                 
30 Hoesterey (n 1) 113. For instance, Joseph and the Amazing Technicolor Dreamcoat, written 
by Tim Rice and Andrew Lloyd Webber, is a well-known pastiche musical, with influences 
including country and western, Calypso and Elvis Presley. 
31 Dyer (n 15) 9. 
32 Ibid., 1. 
33 Ibid., 2-4. 
34 Dyer (n 15) 9. For instance, the definition of pastiche (pasticcio) in Ian Chilvers, Oxford 
Dictionary of Art and Artists (OUP online 2016) refers to: “A work of art that imitates the 
style of another work, artist, or period; more specifically, in the visual arts, a picture or other 
work that (often with fraudulent intent) imitates the style of a particular artist by borrowing 
and rearranging motifs from his authentic works” (emphasis supplied). 
35 Hoesterey (n 1) ix. 
36 Ibid., xi-xii; see also Annette Kuhn and Guy Westwell, Oxford Dictionary of Film Studies 
(OUP online version 2015), suggesting that whilst pastiche “is sometimes used pejoratively, 
implying lack of originality”, when “regarded as a feature of postmodernism it tends to shed 
such negative overtones.” For a negative stance, see Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the 
Current Logic of Late Capitalism (Duke 1991), esp 17-25, suggesting that pastiche has come 
to replace parody, but “without any of parody’s ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric 
impulse, devoid of laughter.” 
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and literature, in commercial art, in popular music, and in performance modes range 
from neo-operatic to MTV idioms.”37 
Depending on one’s preferred definition, pastiche therefore encompasses or overlaps 
with other aesthetic categories such as appropriation art, assemblage and collage, 
capriccio, cento, hip hop, montage and patchwork.38 In contrast, there seems to be 
greater consensus that pastiche and parody can be contrasted due to intention and 
impact. For instance, it has been said that whilst pastiche “borrows closely, openly, 
appreciatively, and often playfully from the styles of previous works, frequently 
combining elements of different styles”, the imitation present in parody is one “in a 
spirit of mockery or ridicule”. 39  Again, though, the degree of divergence – and 
overlap – depends on one’s preferred definitions. Hoesterey, for example, describes 
parody as involving “satirical, critical, or polemical intention” – “[c]haracteristic 
features of the work are retained but are imitated with contrastive intention, whereas 
in pastiche this relationship is one of similarity.”40 That said, she also notes that other 
descriptions of parody which focus on “transposition” and staging a “confrontation” 
with a “canonical text”, and which may be closer to her postmodern view of 
pastiche.41 
Returning to section 30A of the CDPA, there is no statutory definition of caricature, 
parody and pastiche. Guidance issued by the Intellectual Property Office in 2014 
stated that all three terms “have their usual meaning in everyday language”, taking 
account “of the context and purpose of … copyright exceptions.”42 The IPO stated 
that: 
In broad terms: parody imitates a work for humorous or satirical effect. It 
evokes an existing work while being noticeably different from it. Pastiche is 
musical or other composition made up of selections from various sources or one 
that imitates the style of another artist or period. A caricature portrays its 
subject in a simplified or exaggerated way, which may be insulting or 
complimentary and may serve a political purpose or be solely for 
entertainment.43  
                                                 
37 Ibid., xi. 
38 Hoesterey (n 1) 10-15; Dyer (n 15) 11-16. 
39 Kuhn and Westwell (n 34). 
40 Hoesterey (n 1) 14. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Intellectual Property Office, Exceptions to copyright: Guidance for creators and copyright 
owners (IPO 2014) 6. 
43 Ibid.  
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The IPO included an illustration for each sub-type; for pastiche, this was an artist 
using “small fragments from a range of films to compose a larger pastiche artwork.”44  
The wording in the 2014 guidance differed from that used by the IPO in its 2007 
report Taking Forward the Gowers Review, although the definitions in that report 
rehearsed similar themes regarding pastiche: “picture or musical composition from or 
imitating various sources” and “literary or other work composed in the style of a well-
known author, etc”.45 Interestingly, there were indications that in 2007, the IPO did 
not consider pastiche to have any meaningful standalone effect. The IPO emphasised 
the similarities between caricature, parody and pastiche, stating that “these terms are 
all defined in slightly different ways but all can include an element of imitation, and 
may incorporate, to a greater or lesser extent, elements of the original work.”46 It also 
stated that, given the “close relationship between caricature, parody and pastiche”, it 
would use the word parody “as shorthand for all three” in its consultation.47 
Whilst the statements regarding imitation and incorporation are clearly correct, any 
suggestion that the difference between the terms is “slight” would seem to imply an 
unduly narrow understanding of pastiche as a genre. However, this conflation of 
caricature, parody and pastiche – or at least, the lack of any meaningful weight given 
to the three concepts as separate ideas – would seem typical of the field.48  For 
instance, despite recommending an exception based on Article 5(3)(k), the Gowers 
Review used the word pastiche only three times in its 142 page final report, being in 
the text of the proposed reform.49 The discussion leading up to this recommendation 
focused on transformative use in US law, with some reference to parody. Although 
the report was supportive of an exception of similar operation being permissible in 
Europe, it also noted criticisms that, in the hip hop scene, a licensing culture had 
arisen in relation to sampling due to limits in the understanding of transformative 
use.50 The report stated: 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 5. 
45 Intellectual Property Office, Taking Forward the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property: 
Proposed Changes to Copyright Exceptions (IPO 2007) at [188]. 
46 Ibid. at [189]. 
47 Ibid. at [190]. 
48 Eg, Hargreaves Review (n 2) (containing multiple references to parody, but only including 
the word pastiche on a single occasion); Deazley (n 4) (focusing on justifications for a parody 
exception, and stating at p. 786 that “parody is multivalent; it speaks to and embraces a range 
of different cultural practices such as allusion, burlesque, caricature, irony, mimesis, pastiche, 
persiflage, satire, skit, spoof, travesty, and so on”). 
49 Gowers Review (n 2) 6, 68. 
50 Ibid 67. 
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Hip hop is not the first genre to ‘sample’ music: composers from Beethoven to 
Mozart to Bartok to Charles Ives have regularly recycled themes, motifs, and 
segments of prior works. Under the current copyright regime, these creators 
would need to clear permission and negotiate licences to avoid infringement 
suits. The barriers that new musicians have to overcome are extremely high, and 
the homogenisation of hip hop music is, critics argue, a direct response to the 
costs of clearing rights.51 
This discussion of transformative use concluded with two recommendations, one for 
the UK government to introduce a parody exception styled after Article 5(3)(k), and 
the other for the government to press for reform of the Information Society Directive 
“to allow for an exception for creative, transformative or derivative works, within the 
parameters of the Berne Three-Step Test.”52 In presenting these recommendations, it 
would seem that the Gowers Review did not consider the argument that the pastiche 
limb of its proposed new exception would cover musical sampling and indeed many 
other uses that might be considered transformative in US fair use law. As will be 
argued later in this article, it can even be argued that pastiche enjoys advantages over 
transformative use, in particular due to its recognition of artistic borrowing that does 
not seek to convey a new aesthetic or meaning. 
In sum, the ordinary meanings of pastiche suggest that it exhibits features that are 
distinct from, and operate well outside of, the genres of parody and caricature. In 
evaluating what this means for section 30A, Section III considers how the legal 
environment impacts on the interpretation of pastiche as a term in the CDPA. 
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Relevance of exceptions 
Prior to 2014 there was no exception in the CDPA expressly covering caricature, 
parody or pastiche despite imitative genres having a lineage that can be traced back 
long before the advent of the copyright system. The relevance of copyright to these 
acts depends, first, on whether the relevant imitation pertains to protected features of a 
copyright work – if not, for instance because the defendant’s work copies mere ideas, 
styles or techniques, then copyright will not be implicated.53 If protected elements 
                                                 
51 Ibid 67, at [4.86]. 
52 Ibid 68, Recommendation 11. 
53  Eg, Baigent v The Random House Group Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 247 at [145]-[146] 
(discussing the idea-expression dichotomy); Brennan (n 4) 162 (discussing fan fiction and 
similar literary forms). There are challenges in applying this concept, particularly in a world 
where copyright can be infringed without there being any direct copying of the text or 
expression of the claimant’s work: Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd 
[2000] 1 WLR 2416, 2422-2423 (per Lord Hoffmann).  
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have been copied, a second question is whether those elements constitute a substantial 
part of the earlier work. Whilst it was suggested in some English cases that a parody 
might be non-infringing where the defendant had made changes and contributions that 
resulted in an original work,54 by the 1980s this reasoning had been rejected on the 
basis that it misunderstood the substantial part test, which focuses on the copied 
elements vis-à-vis the plaintiff’s work and not the original contributions of the 
defendant.55 Assuming that a prima facie case of infringement is made out, a third key 
question is whether an exception in applicable. For many years, the most obvious 
possibility was fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review.56 However, with 
limitations in the language and judicial interpretations of that provision, there was a 
question mark over its ability to provide a comprehensive answer to the challenges 
posed by parody and other imitative uses.57 
Since October 2014 this position has changed with the introduction, in section 30A of 
the CDPA, of a fair dealing exception directed to caricature, parody or pastiche. As 
noted above, there is no guidance in the CDPA in relation to the meaning of these 
terms, which were taken from Article 5(3)(k) of the Information Society Directive, 
itself also silent regarding their coverage. Looking to the Directive’s travaux 
                                                 
54 See especially Glyn v Weston Feature Film Co [1916] 1 Ch 261; Joy Music v Sunday 
Pictorial Newspaper [1960] 2 QB 60. In Glyn, Younger J suggested (in obiter) that a 
burlesque would not infringe copyright where the defendant “has bestowed such mental 
labour upon what he has taken and has subjected it to such revision and alteration as to 
produce an original result.” This approach was applied in Joy Music to the creation of altered 
lyrics to the song “Rock-a-Billy”, where the only common element came through the words 
“Rock-a-Philip, Rock-a-Philip, Rock-a-Philip, rock” in the chorus of the defendant’s work. It 
was held that this was not an infringement as the author had produced “a new original work 
derived from “Rock-a-Billy’.” 
55  See, eg, Schweppes Ltd v Wellingtons Ltd [1984] FSR 210; Williamson Music Ltd v 
Pearson Partnership Ltd [1987] FSR 97; Allen v Redshaw (Patents County Court, 15 May 
2013). 
56 CDPA, s 30(1); see, also, TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Network Ten Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 
108 at [17] (Conti J discussing possibility that parody and satire can fall within the Australian 
fair dealing defence covering criticism and review). 
57 One limitation is the requirement in the CDPA that the criticism or review must be of “that 
or another work or of a performance of a work”, a requirement that first appeared in section 
6(2) of the Copyright Act 1956. Although there is authority that the relevant review or 
criticism can relate to the underlying thoughts, ideas and philosophy of a work (eg, Hubbard 
v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84; Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK Television Ltd [1999] FSR 
610), there have also been instances where this language has operated to take a criticism 
outside the defence (eg, Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2002] Ch 149). In the 1980s case 
Williamson Music Ltd v Pearson Partnership Ltd (n 55), Judge Paul Baker QC noted at p. 103 
the potential relevance of a fair dealing defence to parody, but stated that it was inapplicable 
on these facts because there was no element of literary criticism or review in the defendant’s 
work, a television advertisement for a bus company that included a jingle said to parody the 
Rodgers and Hammerstein song, “There is Nothin’ Like a Dame”.  
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préparatoires, we see that Article 5(3)(k) was requested by the French delegation.58 
Its first iteration appeared in draft text dated 28 March 2000, with the language 
seemingly modelled on an existing French exception.59 Little else is disclosed by the 
legislative history, suffice for earlier versions of the proposed Directive containing a 
recital referring to the continued application of national exceptions covering “other 
cases of minor importance” such as “certain forms of humorous use”.60 With the 
French delegation pressing for a specific exception,61 this text did not find its way into 
the recitals as implemented. Thus, with no direct guidance in the Directive itself, and 
minimal explanation in the travaux, the legislative framework of the Directive does 
little to elucidate the reach of Article 5(3)(k).  
B. The French approach 
Given its origins in French law, one line of inquiry might be to consider how pastiche 
is understood in the copyright jurisprudence in that country. The French protection for 
pastiche is found in Article L122-5 of the Intellectual Property Code, which provides 
that “once a work has been disclosed, the author may not prohibit … parody, pastiche 
and caricature, observing the rules of the genre.”62  It has been suggested that in 
France these acts are governed by the same rules but apply to different types of work, 
with parodies relating to musical works, video and film; caricature to visual or 
figurative works; and pastiche to literary works.63 This accords with the (legal) view, 
mentioned earlier, that caricature, parody and pastiche are essentially 
interchangeable.64  For instance, Cabay and Lambrecht suggest that “scholars now 
                                                 
58 Summary of Proceedings from the Working Group on Intellectual Property (Copyright) 
dated 29-30 March 1999, doc 7299/99 PI 18 CULTURE 21 CODEC 176, 2 (“several Member 
States” have requested additional option exceptions be added to draft Article 5(3), including 
“caricature, parody and pastiche”); Summary of Proceedings from the Working Group on 
Intellectual Property (Copyright) dated 16-17 December 1999, doc 5377/00 PI 5 CULTURE 
3 CODEC 36 at [46] (“The [French] delegation requested an additional exception covering 
parody, pastiche and caricature”). 
59 Amended proposal dated 28 March 2000, doc 6652/00, PI 14 CULTURE 11 CODEC 154. 
60 Amended proposal dated 30 September 1999, doc 11435/00, PI 49 CULTURE 63 CODEC 
520, recital 24ter.  
61 Ibid., footnote 16 (“The [French] delegation requested a specific exception on parody, 
pastiche and caricature in the main body of the Directive instead of a reference to humorous 
use in this Recital”). 
62 Code de la propiété intellectuelle, Art L 122-5: “Lorsque l’oeuvre a été divulguée, l'auteur 
ne peut interdire: … 4° La parodie, le pastiche et la caricature, compte tenu des lois du genre 
…”. 
63 See, eg, Henri Desbois, Le droit d'auteur en France (Dalloz, 3rd edition, 1978) at [254]; 
Dinusha Mendis and Martin Kretschmer, The Treatment of Parodies under Copyright Law in 
Seven Jurisdictions: A Comparative Review of the Underlying Principles (Intellectual 
Property Office 2013), 18; Laetitia Lagarde and Carolyn Ang, “Parody in the UK and France: 
defined by humour?” (2016) 27 PLC, Internet. 
64 See above n 7. 
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agree that those three terms must be considered as synonyms, or at least that [any] 
formal difference between them should bear no legal consequences.”65 
Looking to the French case law, it would seem that whilst there have been some 
attempts to distinguish between parody and pastiche, 66  the definitions given to 
pastiche have been unclear, inconsistent and ultimately irrelevant because courts have 
identified common considerations that tend to be present in a successful defence 
under Article L122-5,67 for instance that the defendant’s work is intended to make 
people laugh, involves a substantial modification of the earlier work (so that the two 
works cannot be confused) and does not cause harm to the first author (eg, by 
alienating the public from the first work).68 The Dezandre decision of 1990 illustrates 
this point. The publisher of the newspaper Libération brought proceedings in relation 
to a record sleeve depicting a newspaper front page said to copy elements from 
Liberátion’s front page. 69  There were a number of limbs to the complaint; the 
copyright aspect related to the alleged reproduction of Liberátion’s layout. Defences 
of parody and pastiche both failed. The Court of Appeals in Paris described pastiche 
as imitating “a particular manner” and parody as imitating “a serious work by 
caricaturing it”,70 which is somewhat consistent with the distinctions between parody 
and pastiche discussed in Section II. However, the Court also suggested that for both 
defences, it was necessary for the defendant to aim to cause laughter; here, whilst 
there were shocking “course expressions” on the sleeve, they had “no comic virtue 
whatever”. 71  By analysing parody and pastiche using common considerations – 
including the presence of comic intent – the distinction between the two aesthetic 
forms may have been rendered largely irrelevant. 
                                                 
65 Julien Cabay and Maxime Lambrecht, “Remix prohibited: how rigid EU copyright laws 
inhibit creativity” (2015) 10 J Int Prop Law & Practice 359, 371. See also Michel Vivant and 
Jean-Michel Bruguière, Droit d’auteur et droits voisins (Dalloz, 3rd edn, 2015) 648 (in favour 
of the view that the three terms are interchangeable). 
66 See, eg, Cour de Cassation, 12 January 1988, RIDA July 1988 p. 98; Versailles Court of 
Appeal, 17 March 1994, RIDA April 1995 p. 350. 
67 I would like to acknowledge the input of Maxence Rivoire, who reviewed and helped 
translate numerous French language materials, in developing this point. 
68 See, eg, SA Les Editions Salabert v Le Luron (Cour D’Appel, Paris, 15 October 1985) 
[1987] ECC 48 at [3]; SA Jacobs Suchard France v Antenne 2 (Cour D’Appel, Paris, 27 
November 1990) [1992] ECC 344 at [1]; Mendis and Kretschmer (n 63), 18-19. 
69 Jacques Dezandre v SA Musidisc and Societe Nouvelle de Presse et de Communication 
(Cour D’Appel, Paris, 25 October 1990) [1992] ECC 495. 
70 Ibid. at [4]. 
71 Ibid. 
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C. Deckmyn v Vandersteen 
Whilst the French authorities provide a sense of the interpretative approaches in that 
country, they must be read subject to the judgment of the Court of Justice in Deckmyn 
v Vandersteen.72 The facts of Deckmyn are well-known, and involved a member of a 
far-right political party distributing calendars containing an image that resembled a 
drawing from the comic strip Suske en Wiske. The purpose of the defendant’s work 
was to criticise the spending priorities of the mayor of Ghent, who was shown 
distributing money to a group of people, some of whom had brown skin and others of 
whom wore veils. In a copyright action brought by the creator’s heirs and other 
rightsholders in Belgium, the defendants argued that the calendar fell within that 
country’s parody defence.73  The Court of Appeal of Brussels stayed proceedings 
pending a referral to the Court of Justice regarding the meaning of parody in Article 
5(3)(k) of the Information Society Directive. 
Although Deckmyn focused on parody, its reasoning is significant to pastiche for a 
number of reasons. First, it teaches us that we cannot simply transplant French 
understandings of pastiche across Europe. This is because the Grand Chamber held 
that parody is an “autonomous European concept” – ie, one that must be interpreted 
uniformly across EU Member States 74  – and provided guidance (discussed next) 
regarding the meaning of that term. If this is correct, then logic demands that pastiche 
follow suit given its shared legislative history and doctrinal context. At most, the 
French jurisprudence reflects a possible approach to construing pastiche. 
Secondly, Deckmyn suggests that the plain meaning of statutory language is relevant 
to, but not solely constitutive of, its legal definition. The Grand Chamber noted that 
parody, which is not defined in the Information Society Directive, should be 
construed by considering its “usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking 
into account the context in which it occurs and the purposes of the rules of which it is 
part”.75 This approach, which for the reasons given above must apply to pastiche, 
might be described as a purposive semantic assessment: one looks not only at the 
plain language of a provision but also its goals and surrounding infrastructure. Using 
this methodology, the Grand Chamber said that there are two essential characteristics 
of parody: that it evokes, but is noticeably different from, an existing work; and that it 
                                                 
72 Deckmyn (n 9); for a comprehensive analysis of this case, see Griffiths (n 4). 
73 Law on Copyright and Related Rights, Art 22(1) (applying to caricature, parody or pastiche 
that observes fair practice). 
74 Deckmyn (n 9) at [14]-[17], citing Padawan SL v Sociedad General de Autores y Editores 
de España (C-467/08) [2010] ECR I-10055 at [32]. 
75 Ibid. at [19], citing Diakité v Commissaire General aux Refugies et aux Apatrides (C-
285/12) [2014] 1 WLR 2477 at [27] (discussing the meaning of “internal armed conflict” for 
the purposes of the Qualification Directive). 
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involves humour or mockery.76 For the Grand Chamber, this definition accorded with 
the relevant legal context, namely that exceptions be interpreted strictly but in a way 
that enables their effectiveness; 77  and reflected the objective of Art 5(3)(k) in 
supporting free speech and the public interest. 78  Similarly, Advocate-General 
Villalón, whose interpretative efforts were aided by dictionary definitions of parody 
in the Spanish, French, German, Dutch and English languages,79  saw his task as 
developing a copyright understanding of parody. As he noted at one point, in talking 
about the “decidedly troubled field” created by parody, he was referring “not … to the 
field of art theory, into which it is clearly not for me to enter, but rather the field of 
copyright.”80 
However, the Grand Chamber went further, stating that in applying Article 5(3)(k), a 
“fair balance” must be maintained between the rights and interests of rightsholders 
and the freedom of expression of users. 81  The idea of fair balance is mentioned 
explicitly in Recital 31 of the Information Society Directive,82 and has been cited in 
other copyright case law in the Court of Justice.83 The Grand Chamber stated that in 
determining how to preserve such a balance, “all the circumstances of the case must 
be taken into account,”84 which in this instance might include any discriminatory 
message conveyed by the defendants’ work.85 This latter aspect, which would seem to 
countenance a compelled speech argument, will be discussed in more detail later. For 
now it is relevant to note that this fair balance assessment seems to be a very different 
beast from the purposive semantic analysis, operating more in the nature of a human 
rights balancing or proportionality exercise. 
                                                 
76 Ibid. at [20], citing AG Villalón (n 7) at [48]. For a discussion of these limbs and their 
application, see Griffiths (n 4). 
77 Ibid. at [22]-[24], citing ACI Adam BV v Stichting de Thuiskopie [2014] ECDR 13 at [23] 
and Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure (C-403/08 & C-429/08) [2012] 
ECDR 8 at [163]. 
78 Ibid. at [25]. 
79 AG Villalón (n 7) at [47]. 
80 Ibid. at [52]. 
81 Deckmyn (n 9) at [26]-[27]. 
82 Recital 31 states: “A fair balance of rights and interests between the different categories of 
rightholders, as well as between the different categories of rightholders and users of protected 
subject-matter must be safeguarded. …” 
83 Eg, Padawan SL v Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de Espana (SGAE) (C-467/08) 
[2011] ECDR 1 at [38]-[50]; Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH (C-145/10) [2012] ECDR 6 at 
[132]-[136]. 
84 Deckmyn (n 9) at [28]. 
85 Ibid. at [31]. 
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That Deckmyn might have an influence on the French approach is suggested by the 
recent “Glamour” decision of the Cour De Cassation. 86  That case concerned 
photographs by a fashion photographer that had been incorporated into paintings by 
an artist intending to create “a parodic perspective of the consumerist society”.87 
Although Deckmyn was not cited by the Cour De Cassation, the decision of the Paris 
Court of Appeal – which had held that there was an infringement – was quashed on 
the basis that the lower court had failed to explain in a “concrete way” how a “fair 
balance” between the freedom of expression of the alleged infringer and the economic 
and moral rights of the author had been analysed.88 The case was remanded to the 
Court of Appeal of Versailles for further consideration. Elsewhere, Deckmyn has been 
cited by the German Federal Court of Justice, also in relation to the reproduction of 
photographs.89 In that case, a news website ran a competition in which entrants were 
asked to manipulate photographs of celebrities to make them look overweight, and an 
action was brought by the photographer of a photograph so altered. In considering the 
impact of Deckmyn, the Federal Court of Justice held that the definition of parody 
used in earlier German cases needed to be updated to accord with Deckmyn, for 
instance by omitting the need for the parody to comment on the original work. That 
said, it has also been observed that when discussing fair balance, the Court revived 
some of these requirements, for instance in finding that a defendant’s free speech 
arguments will be stronger if her work comments on the original.90 The case was 
remitted to the Higher Regional Court of Hamburg so that a Deckmyn-informed 
standard could be applied. It therefore remains to be seen how Deckmyn will 
influence the reasoning of domestic judges across Europe, and how such judges will 
undertake the proportionality exercise countenanced by the Court of Justice. 
D. Deckmyn and Parody 
Numerous questions arise in relation to the reasoning in Deckmyn. One is the 
relationship between the Grand Chamber’s two interpretative canons: purposive 
semantic assessment and human rights balancing. Take the statement that parody 
requires the presence of “humour or mockery”, a proposition that, in the UK at least, 
                                                 
86 X v Y (Cour De Cassation, chambre civile 1, 15 May 2015) [2016] ECDR 4; see, also, 
Largarde and Ang (n 63). 
87 Ibid. at [19] (reproducing the plea of counsel for the artist). 
88 Ibid. at [7]-[8]. 
89 Noted in Henrike Maier, “German Federal Court of Justice rules on parody and free use” 
(2017) 12 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 16 (discussing Bundesgerichtshof 
judgment of 28 July 2016). In Germany, parody is protected via the free use in Article 24 of 
the German Copyright Act rather than a specific exception. 
90 Ibid., 17. 
Pastiche: Mashed-up drafting?   18 
might not capture the field.91 With the emphasis on fundamental freedoms later in the 
Grand Chamber’s judgment, should free speech ideas also affect the definition of 
parody (and, logically, pastiche), for instance through defendant-preferring 
interpretations? Another is how to deal with statutes that use industry language or 
terms of art: should the understandings of experts or creative constituencies (and not 
just the dictionary) inform the statute’s interpretation? As seen above, Advocate 
General Villalón was keen to avoid art theory when examining parody in Deckmyn,92 
but can Article 5(3)(k) be properly understood without any such analysis? Still 
another question is how to undertake the proportionality exercise contemplated by the 
General Chamber, a matter about which little guidance was rendered. 
In answering these questions, we might start with a logically antecedent matter: are 
we taking an existing artistic or literary concept and inserting it into copyright law, or 
are we developing a legal concept that may depart – perhaps radically – from non-
legal understandings?93 To illustrate, “originality” is a term with a special meaning in 
copyright law, referring in essence to whether a person used the right type of effort in 
creating – ie, originating – a work.94 “Authorship” is closely related to originality, but 
is perhaps a more troublesome concept to the extent that different creator groups have 
different conceptions of an authorial contribution, such ideas not necessarily being 
coterminous with the relevant legal tests.95 Some inconsistency between legal and 
non-legal understandings may nevertheless need to be tolerated given that authorship 
reflects normative, doctrinal and pragmatic decisions about who should receive 
copyright law’s bounty. There may therefore be good reasons to resist private 
ordering of authorship, for instance to do with manipulating rules regarding first 
                                                 
91 English definitions often refer to satirising the relevant target, which may include but go 
beyond the use of humour or mockery: see, eg, OED (n 12) (“n.2 A literary composition 
modelled on and imitating another work, esp. a composition in which the characteristic style 
and themes of a particular author or genre are satirized by being applied to inappropriate or 
unlikely subjects, or are otherwise exaggerated for comic effect. In later use extended to 
similar imitations in other artistic fields, as music, painting, film, etc.”). 
92 See above n 80 and surrounding text. 
93 Graeme Austin describes a similar idea when he says that “determining the ordinary and 
natural meanings” of the words of copyright legislation is “only the beginning of the analysis” 
as “courts often seem to be reaching ‘through’ the statutory text and engaging with deeper 
questions of copyright policy”: Austin (n 8) 684-685. 
94  See generally Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (OUP, 4th 
edition, 2014) 93-95. 
95 Eg, Daniela Simone, “Recalibrating the Joint Authorship Test: Insights from Scientific 
Collaborations” (2013) 26 IPJ 111. 
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ownership and duration, and defining people out of authorship and hence protections 
such as moral rights.96 
Returning to parody, one example of the “legal concept” approach is the Michelin 
decision of the Federal Court of Canada.97 This case related to the reproduction of the 
image of “Bibendum”, the marshmallow-like corporate logo of Michelin, on 
campaign materials produced by a trade union.98 One argument of the union was that 
their use fell within fair dealing. Given that there was no explicit reference to parody 
in the Canadian statute at the time, the relevant purpose was said to be criticism.99 
This defence failed for a number of reasons, including that criticism did not extend to 
parody: to give “such a large meaning” to criticism would be to create “a new 
exception to the copyright infringement, a step that only Parliament would have the 
jurisdiction to do.”100 Teitelbaum J stated: 
I do accept that parody in a generic sense can be a form of criticism; however, it 
is not ‘criticism’ for the purposes of the Copyright Act as an exception under the 
fair dealing heading.101 
This decision therefore countenanced a division between “criticism” as a fair dealing 
purpose and the ordinary meanings of the word,102 the latter of which would seem to 
include acts of evaluation and judgment that inhere in many parodies. In drawing this 
distinction, Teitelbaum J was swayed by the absence of Canadian or Commonwealth 
case law in which parody had amounted to criticism,103 and the view that exceptions 
should be interpreted strictly.104 Whilst this article would challenge the reasoning that 
led the judge to this particular conclusion, Michelin demonstrates that interpretations 
of fair dealing purposes cannot be judged solely by reference to non-legal meanings. 
                                                 
96 Eg, Beggars Banquet v Carlton [1993] EMLR 349 (Ch) (company not able to rely on a 
term of a contract that they were the authors of footage); cf Heptulla v Orient Longman 
[1989] FSR 598 (subjective intentions and conduct of the parties relevant to the conclusion 
that there was joint authorship of the relevant literary work). 
97 Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v National Automobile, 
Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) [1997] 2 
FC 306 (Federal Court of Canada). 
98 For instance, one leaflet included a cartoon depicting “a broadly smiling ‘Bibendum’, arms 
crossed, with his foot raised, seemingly ready to crush underfoot an unsuspecting Michelin 
worker”: ibid., 354. 
99 Ibid., 377-378, citing Copyright Act (RSC 1985, c C-42) s 27(2)(a.1). 
100 Ibid., 381. 
101 Ibid. 
102 See OED (n 91) (“1. The action of criticizing, or passing judgement upon the qualities or 
merits of anything; esp. the passing of unfavourable judgement; fault-finding, censure.”). 
103 Michelin (n 97) 379. 
104 Ibid. This was the prevailing view in Canada at the time: eg, Normand Tamaro, The 1997 
Annotated Copyright Act (Carswell, 1996) 330. 
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If a case with similar facts were heard in Canada today, it is possible that the opposite 
outcome would be reached given the legislative expansion of Canadian fair dealing to 
include parody and satire, and the forward-leaning understanding of exceptions 
preferred in CCH v Law Society of Upper Canada and later cases.105  
In Europe, the conclusion in Deckmyn that parody is an autonomous European 
concept is consistent with a separate copyright understanding of the term, as it 
suggests a definition that transcends national boundaries and cultural norms. In a 
similar vein, Graeme Austin states that: 
this part of the CJEU’s holding gives support to the claim that, in the copyright 
context, legislative terminology might sometimes be less important than the 
fundamental principles that the statutory language is attempting to capture. … 
By characterising ‘parody’ as an autonomous European concept, the CJEU 
seems to be reaching beyond whatever textual variations might appear in 
domestic law iterations of the defence and insisting that the scope of the defence 
be construed in the light of copyright’s deeper systemic commitments.106 
The human rights balancing exercise bolsters this viewpoint, as it suggests the 
existence of universal factors that may influence the reach of Article 5(3)(k). That 
said – and as noted above – a key issue about Deckmyn is the lack of guidance 
regarding the relationship between the definition of parody and the need for 
proportionality. If parody is a vehicle for free speech, then should we interpret the 
Grand Chamber’s conditions for parody in ways that prefer the defendant? The 
discussion of fair balance by the Advocate-General contained some suggestion that 
this concept was relevant to the classification of a work as a parody: 
Taking into account the ‘presence’ that fundamental rights must be 
acknowledged to have in the legal system as a whole, I believe that, in principle 
                                                 
105 Copyright Act (RSC 1985, c C-42) s 29; CCH v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 
13; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada, 2012 
SCC 36; see also Laura J. Murray and Samuel E. Trosow, Canadian Copyright: A Citizen’s 
Guide (Between the Lines 2007), 78. In United Airlines, Inc v Cooperstock, 2017 FC 616, 
Phelan J cited these decisions when considering whether fair dealing in s 29 applied to the 
website UNTIED.com. This website presented negative information and complaints about the 
airline United, and was designed in such a way that it resembled United’s actual website. In 
addition to claims grounded in trade mark law, United argued that the UNTIED website 
infringed copyright in United’s website and various logos. In concluding that fair dealing did 
not apply, Phelan J accepted that the defendant’s use was for an allowable purpose – parody – 
as it evoked existing works whilst showing differences from those works, and was an 
expression of mockery: at [109]-[120], including endorsement of the definition of parody in 
Deckmyn (n 9). However, the defendant failed because his dealing was not fair: his motive 
was to embarrass and punish United; his website reproduced closely the home page of 
United’s website; and the confusion brought about by that similarity could lead users of the 
defendant’s website to believe they were interacting with United: at [121]-[141]. 
106 Austin (n 8) 698-699. 
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and strictly from the perspective of the concept of parody, a particular image 
cannot be excluded from that concept solely because the author of the original 
work does not agree with the message or because the latter may deserve to be 
rejected by a large section of public opinion. However, distortions of the original 
work which, in form or substance, convey a message radically opposed to 
society’s most deeply held beliefs, on which the European public space is 
constructed and exists, should not be accepted as a parody and the authors of 
the work with whose assistance the parody is created are authorised to assert as 
much.107 
In contrast, the Grand Chamber’s judgment seemed to treat fair balance differently, 
going to “the application, in a particular case, of the exception for parody”.108 It 
therefore countenanced a two-stage approach in which the defendant’s work was 
initially classified as a parody (or not) by reference to the “essential requirements” of 
parody, and then a determination made as to whether, “in the light of all the 
circumstances of the case”, a fair balance between different stakeholders would be 
preserved if the defence was enlivened.109 The Grand Chamber did not discuss what, 
if any, further conditions were provided by the three-step test language in Article 
5(5).110  This may reflect the questions posed by the referring court, which were 
directed towards the definition of parody. 111  That said, it seems odd to mention 
proportionality without explaining how this relates to the three-step test. The question 
therefore remains whether a parody that satisfies the Grand Chamber’s two-stage test 
may fail on the basis that the requirements of Article 5(5) have not also been met. 
                                                 
107 Ibid. at [85].  
108 Deckmyn (n 9) at [27]. 
109 Ibid. at [32]-[35]. 
110 This connects to broader questions about the addressee for Art 5(5), and in particular 
whether its limbs are to be considered by domestic judges applying exceptions even if those 
limbs have not been transposed directly into the local statute. In Europe, there is authority 
from the Court of Justice that Art 5(5) is targeted to domestic judges, although the position is 
not clear-cut: see Richard Arnold and Eleanora Rosati, “Are national courts the addressee of 
the InfoSoc three-step test?” (2015) 10 JIP Law & Practice 741. In the UK, almost all fair 
dealing cases have proceeded without any consideration of Art 5(5). For instance, in 
Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Meltwater Holding BV [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch) at [130], 
Proudman J quoted from Art 5(5) but did not indicate how its limbs were relevant to fair 
dealing. In contrast, Arnold J engaged with the effect of Art 5(5) in England and Wales 
Cricket Board Limited v Tixdaq Limited [2016] EWHC 575 (Ch) at [72], [88]-[92], although 
the discussion was impacted by concessions of counsel (namely that the three-step test must 
be applied by national courts) and their treatment of Art 5(5) as dovetailing with the factors 
usually considered in relation to fair dealing. 
111 This point was made by the Advocate General, who stated that consideration of whether 
the limbs of Art 5(5) were satisfied was outside the reference and a matter to be determined 
by the national court: AG Villalón (n 7) at [29]. 
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The judgment in Deckmyn has received mixed reviews in the commentary. It has been 
praised for taking harmonisation seriously, for instance through its treatment of 
parody as an autonomous European concept, and its statement that a fair balance must 
be struck between the interests of rightsholders and users – a concept that has been 
referred to in other cases, and which could, it is said, serve as a unifying test to give 
greater consistency and clarity to the exceptions in Article 5.112 The definition of 
parody has also been welcomed for its liberal tenor,113 although concern has been 
expressed that “the court’s requirement for a parody to be humorous, without any 
further explanation of what humour entails, may be too restrictive.”114 Whilst there is 
something in the observation that humour is subjective and culturally-specific, one 
must bear in mind that the Grand Chamber spoke of parody involving an expression 
of humour or mockery, which would seem consistent with the proposition that 
unfunny parodies can fall within the exception.115 
Perhaps the most compelling criticism – and one that could, as discussed in Section 
IV, be significant for pastiche – relates to the Grand Chamber’s statement that in 
assessing fair balance, attention must be given to any discriminatory message 
conveyed by the defendant’s work. 116  The rightsholders’ contention was that the 
defendant’s drawing had Islamophobic overtones and that some recipients believed 
the calendar to have been produced or endorsed by Suske en Wiske.117 The Grand 
Chamber agreed that, if there was a discriminatory message, rightsholders have “in 
principle, a legitimate interest in ensuring that the work protected by copyright is not 
associated with such a message.”118  At this point it is worth interpolating that a 
commitment to free speech must countenance not only the interests of the speaker but 
of third parties who do not wish to serve as a vehicle for or be (mis)understood as 
                                                 
112  Eg, Jonathan Griffiths, Christophe Geiger, Martin Senftleben, Raquel Xalabarder and 
Lionel Bently, “The European Copyright Society’s ‘Opinion on the judgment of the CJEU in 
Case C-201/13 Deckmyn’” (2015) 37 EIPR 127, 128; Sabine Jacques, “Are national courts 
required to have an (exceptional) European sense of humour?” (2015) 37 EIPR 134, 135. 
113 Griffiths et al (n 112) 128. 
114 Jacques (n 112) 137; for similar, see Lagarde and Ang (n 63). 
115 The same observation has been made by Austin (n 8) 695. In United Airlines, Inc v 
Cooperstock 2017 FC 616 (facts discussed above at n 105), Phelan J, adopting Deckmyn 
reasoning to inform the meaning of parody in the Canadian Copyright Act, said at one point 
that “parody requires humour”: at [133]. Elsewhere in his decision, however, Phelan J 
referred to the requirement for humour or mockery (eg, at [119]), and indeed in holding that 
the UNTIED website was within an allowable fair dealing purpose, Phelan J concluded that 
the website “evokes existing works … while showing some differences … [and] expresses 
mockery (and criticism) of the Plaintiff’: at [120].  
116 Deckmyn (n 9) at [29]-[30]. 
117 Described in AG Villalón (n 7) at [20]. 
118 Ibid. at [31]. 
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sharing the speaker’s message.119 As such, any confusion about association may need 
to be weighed against the speech interests of the defendant, a concern that is best 
thought of in free speech terms as being an objection to “compelled speech”.120 It 
might also be said that the Grand Chamber, by citing the Race Equality Directive and 
Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,121 gave this compelled speech 
argument an objective footing, helping to prevent it from operating as a free-floating 
and self-serving answer to any assertion of a parody defence. 
The difficulty is that the Grand Chamber’s reasoning on this aspect was brief, under-
particularised, and side-stepped questions regarding the use of Article 21 – which 
covers discrimination on “any ground” including “political or any other opinion” – as 
a tool for censorship.122 The Grand Chamber did not engage with the characteristics 
of a “discriminatory message” and the circumstances in which a claimant’s work will 
be “associated … with such a message”, both questions being left to the national 
court. One issue is whether the copyright system is the appropriate forum to ventilate 
complaints about the substantive content of a work. At least in the UK, copyright law 
is not usually concerned with such qualitative assessments: for instance, the 
immorality exclusion remains contentious in its policy basis and effect, and is applied 
infrequently;123 and as stated by Robert Walker LJ in relation to fair dealing: 
If the fair dealing is for the purpose of criticism that criticism may be strongly 
expressed and unbalanced without forfeiting the fair dealing defence: an 
                                                 
119 Compelled speech can take different forms, and there is disagreement over which forms 
result in harm and should be the subject of regulation: eg, Steven H Shiffrin, “What is Wrong 
with Compelled Speech?” (2014) 29 J L & Pol 499. In the UK, compelled speech arguments 
were ventilated recently in Lee v McArthur [2016] NICA 39 in relation to the refusal by the 
proprietors of Ashers Bakery to fulfill an order to bake a cake decorated with the slogan 
“Support Gay Marriage”. The decision of the District Judge, who held that the defendants had 
engaged in direct discrimination against the applicant, was upheld on appeal. In the US, 
similar arguments regarding the right not to speak were unsuccessful in Elane Photography, 
LLC v Willock, 309 P 3d 53 (NM 2013), which concerned discrimination said to arise from 
the refusal by a photographer to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony. 
120 For a similar argument in relation to trade mark parodies, see Robert Burrell and Dev 
Gangjee, “Trade marks and freedom of expression – a call for caution” (2010) 41 IIC 544; 
and see generally Shiffrin (n 119), esp 512-516. 
121 Article 21 covers non-discrimination, with paragraph (1) prohibiting “[a]ny discrimination 
based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, 
language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, 
property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation”. 
122 Jacques (n 112) 134.  
123 For an overview, see Bently and Sherman (n 94) 122-123. 
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author’s remedy for malicious and unjustified criticism lies (if it lies anywhere) 
in the law of defamation, not copyright.124 
Following Deckmyn it has been observed that there are laws directed specifically to 
racist and hate speech,125 and that the (unharmonised) moral rights regime permits 
authors to object to unsavoury associations.126 However, Deckmyn is problematic not 
only for plugging a gap that may or may not exist, but because “copyright law ought 
not to apply a more exacting standard than public or criminal law in this context.”127 
Despite the statement of the Grand Chamber that “[i]t is not disputed that parody is an 
appropriate way to express an opinion”,128 statements in Deckmyn could be relied 
upon to narrow the messages that can be conveyed through the medium of parody. To 
illustrate, the impugned drawing in Deckmyn may have had racist motivations but its 
message pertained to the spending priorities of an elected official. Whatever we may 
think of the merits of these views, there are questions about whether their circulation 
should be limited, a debate not touched upon by the Grand Chamber.129 One might 
also note, in this regard, that political speech is usually given the highest level of 
protection in Strasbourg jurisprudence, including for ideas that “offend, shock or 
disturb”.130 
On the question of whether the claimant’s work was “associated” with any 
discriminatory message, one possibility is that this relates to confusion, ie, that 
members of the public believe that the author or rightsholders made or endorsed the 
defendant’s work.131 The presence of confusion might indicate that the defendant was 
                                                 
124 Pro Sieben Media AG v Carlton UK Television Ltd (n 57) 619; for similar comments, see 
Henry LJ in Time Warner Entertainments Co v Channel Four Television plc [1994] EMLR 1, 
14. 
125 Jonathan Griffiths, Christophe Geiger, Martin Senftleben, Raquel Xalabarder and Lionel 
Bently, “Limitations and exceptions as key elements of the legal framework for copyright in 
the European Union: opinion of the European Copyright Society on the CJEU ruling in Case 
C-201/13 Deckmyn” (2015) 46 IIC 93, 99 (para 30).  
126 Griffith et al (n 112) 129-130. 
127 Agreed statement (n 125), 99 (para 30). 
128 Deckmyn (n 9) at [25]. 
129 It appears that, at the time of writing, there have been no further developments at the 
domestic level in relation to Deckmyn: Eleanora Rosati, “Parody and free use in Germany: 
Federal Court of Justice decides first parody case after Deckmyn”, IPKat, 6 September 2016, 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com.au/2016/09/parody-and-free-use-in-germany-federal.html.   
130 Eg, Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 103 at [42]-[43]; Ceylan v Turkey (2000) 30 EHRR 
73 at [39]-[47]; PETA Deutschland v Germany (2013) 56 E.H.R.R. 25 at [46]. For a recent 
example that has elicited some criticism, see Annen v Germany (3690/10) unreported 26 
November 2015 (ECHR), criticised in unattributed, “Anti-abortion activism” [2016] EHRLR 
211. 
131  In Elane Photography, LLC v Willock (n 119), one reason why the photographer’s 
arguments failed was that reasonable observers would not assume any endorsement of the 
same-sex commitment ceremony on the part of the photographer, who was paid to provide a 
Pastiche: Mashed-up drafting?   25 
not actually successful in creating a parody, eg, that the work lacked any humour or 
mockery, or that this aspect was too subtle. That said, the Grand Chamber said that it 
was not a condition that the work “could reasonably be attributed to a person other 
than the author of the original work itself”. 132  This could reflect concerns about 
circular and self-reinforcing licensing arguments, ie, that the more legal rights are 
thrown around content, the more the public will come to expect that re-use has been 
authorised. Again, none of these difficult questions were discussed by the Grand 
Chamber. If the Grand Chamber was suggesting that an “association” arises from the 
mere evocation of the claimant’s work, this would effect a significant (and arguably 
unprincipled) enlargement of compelled speech reasoning, and could operate to 
expand copyright into matters normally the province of (unharmonised) moral rights. 
To conclude, there are a number of interpretative lessons that can be derived from 
Deckmyn, notably that parody is a copyright concept influenced not just by the 
ordinary meaning of the term but by the goals of Article 5(3)(k) and its status as an 
autonomous European concept. There is also evidence of the Court of Justice 
continuing its retreat from earlier, unqualified, statements that exceptions must be 
interpreted strictly, for instance through its statement that its conception of parody 
was “not called into question” by this principle, 133  its observation that the 
interpretation of parody must “enable the effectiveness of the exception”,134 and its 
emphasis on the freedom of expression of the user.135 We must be careful not to over-
state the pro-user reasoning in this case, as the judgment lacks the unambiguous 
vision of a case like CCH,136 and did not involve a wholesale renouncement of the 
proposition that exceptions must be interpreted strictly. 137  The role of compelled 
speech reasoning remains to be seen, and there are those who doubt whether the 
emphasis on freedom of expression will translate into any significant change in the 
                                                                                                                                           
service. Shiffrin (n 119) 512 contrasts these facts with compelling a person to write speeches 
or press releases for a political party they do not support, or religions they oppose (he gives 
the example of Scientology). Shiffrin argues that these scenarios would be distinguishable 
from Willock because they involve public speech at the core of the First Amendment in 
circumstances more likely to be understood as involving endorsement. 
132 Deckmyn (n 9) at [21]. As discussed above, the definition of parody includes that the 
defendant’s work evokes, but is noticeably different from, the original work: at [20]. This 
would seem to require that the two works not be confused, rather than there being no 
confusion about the authorship of the defendant’s work. 
133 Deckmyn (n 9) at [22]. 
134 Ibid. at [23]. 
135 Ibid. at [27]. 
136 CCH v Law Society of Upper Canada (n 105).  
137 See also Jacques (n 112) 135, describing the Grand Chamber’s approach as strict “but not 
too strict”; cf Griffiths (n 4), stating that the judgment “paid lip-service to the idea that 
copyright exceptions should be interpreted narrowly”. 
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operation of exceptions.138 However, Deckmyn does not suggest a narrow role for 
parody or that we should give the term a limited definition. As discussed in the next 
section, if we apply similar thinking to pastiche, it is possible and indeed desirable to 
construe the exception broadly to cover a range of imitative uses. 
IV. THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF PASTICHE 
A. Definition 
In construing pastiche as a copyright concept, the first task – and the focus of this sub-
section – is to develop a definition that responds to the interpretative cues discussed in 
the foregoing analysis. It is also necessary to explore the relevance of the fair dealing 
infrastructure used in the pastiche exception in the UK. Having undertaken this 
analysis, this article will turn in sub-section B to provide illustrations about how a 
pastiche exception might operate in practice. 
An initial point is that neither a purposive semantic interpretation nor a human rights 
balancing exercise require, or even suggest, that pastiche should be subverted from its 
ordinary usage and be understood as a synonym for parody or otherwise subject to the 
same conditions as this genre. This can be contrasted with the position said to exist in 
France, 139  the oral submissions of Belgium in Deckmyn, 140  and the analysis of 
Deckmyn by Sabine Jacques, who states that the Grand Chamber’s judgment:  
implicitly indicates that ‘parody’, ‘pastiche’ and ‘caricature’ are overlapping, 
rather than impervious terms. While it is possible to highlight characteristics of 
each genre, 141  it may be impossible to delineate each term completely. 
Ultimately, parody must be understood as a ‘multivalent’ term which operates at 
different levels and comprises many genres, such as satire, pastiche and 
caricature. 
Jacques does not provide any citation to the judgment to explain why this perspective 
is “implicit” in its words, and there is ambiguity around what, precisely, she is 
asserting in the quote above. There was no discussion of pastiche or caricature by the 
Grand Chamber, with these terms only appearing in the judgment in extracts from the 
relevant EU and Belgian provisions.142 This contrasts with the brief discussion by the 
                                                 
138 See Austin (n 8) 696 (Deckmyn is “unlikely to mandate an especially broad approach to the 
EU parody exception. The true position is likely to prove more complex. When the CJEU has 
previously considered the relationship between freedom of expression and the rights of 
copyright owners, it has not countenanced any significant dismantling of the latter”).  
139 Described above n 62 to n 70 and surrounding text. 
140 Described above n 7. 
141 She cites Deazley (n 4) 786 and two other texts on parody. 
142 Deckmyn (n 9) at [5], [6]. 
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Advocate General, but even here there was no sustained analysis of the distinction 
between each term, such a comparison being of “[no] particular relevance [for] 
present purposes.”143 The Advocate General’s opinion is clearly consistent with there 
being overlap between caricature, parody and pastiche, but if anything points towards 
each term being on the same rung of the hierarchy and doing independent work.144 
Similarly, whilst it can be argued that the Grand Chamber construed parody broadly 
to cover target and weapon parody,145 acts that may be classified as “satire” in other 
jurisdictions,146 it is quite a leap to say that pastiche is a sub-branch of parody. This is 
not only because of the absence of any such definitive statement in Deckmyn, but 
because of the risks of overlooking the separate history and operation of pastiche, and 
subjecting it to the conditions of parody, including the need for humour or mockery. 
The contention preferred in this article is that, in accordance with Deckmyn, we start 
with the ordinary meaning of pastiche, which as discussed in Section II covers 
imitation of the style of pre-existing works, the incorporation of parts of earlier works 
into new works, and the production of medleys. In ascertaining the copyright meaning 
of pastiche, we must also consider the “purpose of the rules of which [Article 5(3)(k)] 
is part”, 147  including that our interpretation “enable the effectiveness of the 
exception”. 148  This purposive semantic assessment points against unduly narrow 
definitions, as seen by the Grand Chamber’s interpretation of parody by reference to 
two essential features – evoking but being noticeably different from the parodied 
work, and being an expression of humour or mockery – and its rejection of other 
possible requirements, for instance that the parody relate to the original work.149  
                                                 
143 AG Villalón (n 7) at [46]. 
144 Ibid. The Advocate General observed that it “may be difficult in a specific case to assign a 
particular work to one concept or another” and that “all those concepts have the same effect 
of derogating from the copyright of the author of the original work which, in one way or 
another, is present in the – so to speak – derived work.” The tenor of the opinion – whilst 
brief on this aspect – seems to be that the three purposes in Article 5(3)(k) have distinct 
operation, with the key common feature (ie, imitation present in the defendant’s work) being 
at a high level of generality. 
145 The language of target and weapon parody is used by, eg, Spence (n 4) 594-595, observing 
that target parodies comment on the text or its creator, whereas weapon parodies use the text 
to comment on something else. In Deckmyn (n 9) at [21], the Grand Chamber rejected the 
condition that the defendant’s work “should relate to the original work itself”. 
146 Eg, Australia and Canada have both extended fair dealing to cover parody and satire: 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 41A, 103AA; Copyright Act (RSC 1985, c C-42) s 29. In the US, 
there is authority that fair use can apply not only to parody but to satire: see Blanch v Koons, 
467 F 3d 244 (2nd circuit 2006), 254-255 (characterising the defendant’s work as a satire). 
147 Deckmyn (n 9) at [19].  
148 Ibid. at [23]. 
149 Ibid. at [20]-[21]. 
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Applying this approach to pastiche, it is not problematic that experts in art theory may 
adopt nuanced and competing definitions of pastiche; whilst these perspectives are 
useful to build a picture of pastiche, we are ultimately developing a copyright term 
rather than seeking to mediate a specialist debate. To illustrate, Dyer describes 
pastiche as “unconcealed”, “textually signalled” (ie, there are markers within or 
alongside the work to indicate the imitation) and “evaluatively open” (ie, the work 
does not imply any evaluation of the referent).150 He uses this schema to draw a 
distinction between pastiche and other practices; for instance, he contrasts pastiche 
with homage and parody on the basis that the latter are “evaluatively predetermined”, 
either implying a positive evaluation (homage) or a negative one (parody). Leaving 
aside the fact that this is but one expert opinion, imbuing pastiche with too many 
characteristics may not only depart from its “essential characteristics” arising from 
everyday language,151 but import into copyright law various imponderable aesthetic 
matters that judges are usually keen to avoid,152 and effect a narrowing of pastiche 
that is contrary to the rights of users and the public interest.153 
In this regard, the call in this article for a broad definition of pastiche comes not only 
from statements in Deckmyn but from underlying normative perspectives on the role 
of exceptions in copyright law. First, it reflects the proposition that much balance is 
achieved in copyright law through exceptions, and that exceptions should be given a 
robust interpretation.154 Secondly, it responds to lessons from the legal rulemaking 
literature in relation to the drafting of exceptions,155 including the inefficiency and 
impossibility of government drafting a series of detailed rules to deal with every 
possible contingency.156 For instance, the use of fine-textured labels risks generating 
uncertain, inconsistent and unprincipled results if applied to Article 5(3)(k), especially 
                                                 
150 Dyer (n 15) 22-25. 
151 Deckmyn (n 9) at [20]. 
152 One might question whether judges are deluding themselves with statements that they are 
avoiding aesthetic considerations, and indeed certain analytical techniques show clear 
parallels with different strands of aesthetic theory: see, eg, Alfred C. Yen, “Copyright 
Opinions and Aesthetic Theory” (1998) 71 Southern California Law Review 247. See also 
Barton Beebe, “Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making of American 
Copyright Law” (2017) 117 Columbia Law Review 319. 
153 Deckmyn (n 9) at [25]-[26], citing recitals 3 and 31 of the Information Society Directive. 
154 Robert Burrell, Michael Handler, Emily Hudson and Kimberlee Weatherall, ALRC Inquiry 
into Copyright and the Digital Economy: Submission in response to Issues Paper No. 42 (14 
December 2012) esp 3-8; see also CCH v Law Society of Upper Canada (n 105) at [48] 
(describing exceptions as user rights, and calling for a “proper balance” to be maintained 
between copyright owner and user interests through non-restrictive interpretations). 
155  Emily Hudson, “Implementing Fair Use in Copyright Law: Lessons from Australia” 
(2013) 25 IPJ 201, esp 218-221. 
156 See also Justice Laddie, “Copyright: over-strength, over-regulated, over-rated?” (1996) 18 
EIPR 253, 258. 
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given that this provision speaks of only three practices (caricature, parody and 
pastiche) whilst aesthetic theory recognises many closely-related variants and 
overlapping categories.157 In addition, one of the attractions of a broad-acting pastiche 
defence is that it obviates the need for government to draft specific exceptions to deal 
with each possible sub-category, eg, mash-ups, music sampling, appropriation art, and 
so forth.158 This connects to a third benefit of giving pastiche a broad interpretation: 
that in the UK, Article 5 of the Information Society Directive places limits on the 
ability of government to draft new exceptions.159 Finally, the approach preferred in 
this article aligns with that adopted in cases like CCH v Law Society of Upper 
Canada, where fair dealing purposes were given a “large and liberal”160 interpretation 
and the intellectual heavy lifting done mainly through fairness factors. This point will 
be addressed in further detail soon. 
Returning to section 30A, the copyright definition of pastiche should reflect the 
term’s essential meaning, which covers two key activities: imitation of the style of 
pre-existing works, and the utilisation or assemblage of pre-existing works in new 
works. It is not necessary for this definition to be narrowed to reflect distinctions 
drawn by musicologists and others between pastiche and pasticcio – the word 
“pastiche” as a copyright concept should cover all dimensions. Nor is it necessary for 
pastiche to involve some sort of humour, critical commentary or element of surprise, 
such requirements being inapt for an anti-twist genre – in contrast with caricature and 
parody, pastiche includes uses that are neutral towards, or celebrate, the referent. 
Acknowledgement of the imitated work should not be required for a work to be a 
pastiche, although this may be relevant to whether there has been a fair dealing, for 
instance for fakes that are presented as authentic works.161 Similarly, whilst some 
                                                 
157 For instance, Dyer’s schema compares fourteen practices: plagiarism, fake, forgery, hoax, 
copies, version, genre, pastiche, emulation, homage, travesty, burlesque, mock epic and 
parody: Dyer (n 15) 24. As noted above at n 38 and surrounding text, pastiche can overlap 
with aesthetic categories such as appropriation art, collage, hip hop, montage, etc. 
158  Some of these acts might conceivably fall within a quotation exception, if such an 
exception is interpreted broadly and as applying beyond quotations from literary works. This 
is the thesis being pursed by Tanya Aplin and Lionel Bently. For a summary of the quotation 
exception in the CDPA, see Bently and Sherman (n 94) 238-241. 
159 Article 5 of the Information Society Directive contains a list of exceptions that may be 
introduced by Member States in relation to rights harmonised by that Directive (ie, 
reproduction, communication to the public and distribution). This has been read as a closed 
list that does not permit, for example, broader fair use-style exceptions: Hargreaves Review 
(n 2) [5.6], [5.18]-[5.19]. 
160 CCH v Law Society of Upper Canada (n 105) at [51]; similar at [54]. 
161 It must also be remembered that if the relevant complaint relates to misrepresentation of 
authorship, there are other causes of action that can be pressed, such as consumer protection 
regimes, moral rights, and criminal actions for fraud. Indeed, it has been argued that for the 
visual arts, where consumers place a high value on authenticity such that a copy, however 
perfect, does not generally substitute for the original, the market will often operate to render a 
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specialist definitions of pastiche refer to “evident recombination”,162 we should be 
reluctant to import this requirement into the copyright definition, because of the 
potential for it to necessitate inquiry into subjective and contested matters regarding 
creator intention, audience knowledge, and the like. 
Applying this approach, pastiche in section 30A could apply to mash-ups, fan fiction, 
music sampling, collage, appropriation art, medleys, and many other forms of homage 
and compilation. This approach takes seriously the speech interests of the defendant, 
and embodies the proposition that imitation is an important and legitimate part of 
artistic creation. Lest this definition seem too broad, it must be remembered, first, that 
many instances of pastiche will not implicate copyright (being in the style of a work 
or author, rather than reproducing protectable expression), and secondly, that this act 
of classification is not the end of the story. Under Deckmyn, a proportionately 
exercise will also be necessary, and there may be additional work by virtue of the 
three-step test language of Article 5(5). In the UK, it is likely that, in the absence of 
statutory reform, courts will integrate these requirements through the fairness 
component of fair dealing.163 This would make sense, and as discussed above is the 
logical place for narrowing to take place. In short, there is no need to read down the 
definition of “pastiche” when we can use fairness to ensure to provide limits to the 
application of the exception. 
In the next sub-section, this article will use two US cases to illustrate its approach to 
pastiche, and some of the potential dangers of the compelled speech arguments in 
Deckmyn. Before turning to these illustrations, it must be acknowledged that the 
foregoing analysis is based on the current relationship between the UK and EU. Given 
the June 2016 referendum result, there may be a change in the status of EU law in the 
UK in the future. However, even if there is a “hard” Brexit in which European 
directives and case law cease to have binding effect, the interpretation of pastiche 
called for in this article can stand on its own two feet, given its normative grounding 
and its utilisation of fairness factors to create a nuanced application of the exception. 
A broad approach to pastiche does not, therefore, depend on European infrastructure. 
B. Illustration 
Two examples – both taken from the fair use jurisprudence of the US – will be used to 
help explain the conception of pastiche called for in this article.  
                                                                                                                                           
copyright complaint unnecessary: see Amy Adler, “Fair Use and the Future of Art” (2016) 91 
NYU L Rev 559, 618-625.  
162 Dyer (n 15) 9. 
163 See especially England and Wales Cricket Board Limited v Tixdaq Limited [2016] EWHC 
575 (Ch). The degree to which this will allow courts to apply the existing fair dealing case 
law has been questioned: eg, Griffiths (n 4). 
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The first example is the Second Circuit decision in Cariou v Prince. The plaintiff, 
Patrick Cariou, was a professional photographer who had taken photographs of the 
Rastafarian population in Jamaica and published them in a book titled Yes, Rasta. 
These photographs were used by the defendant, well-known appropriation artist 
Richard Prince, in paintings forming part of his “Canal Zone” series. These works 
utilised Cariou’s photographs (along with others) with various techniques applied, eg, 
cropping, collage, tinting and over-painting. Both sides applied for summary 
judgment, with the defendants arguing that the paintings fell within fair use. At first 
instance the plaintiff’s motion was granted in relation to copyright infringement, fair 
use and liability.164 Judge Batts held that none of the fair use factors favoured the 
defendants, observing that any transformation was minimal and did not involve 
comment, that there was a large commercial element to exhibition and sale of Prince’s 
works, and that there was evidence of actual market harm.  
On appeal, the findings on fair use were reversed for twenty-five of the works and 
remanded in relation to the remaining five.165 The Court of Appeals held that it was 
wrong for the District Court to read into fair use a requirement that the defendant 
comment on or critically refer back to the original works; all that was required was 
that the new work “alter the original with ‘new expression, meaning, or message.’”166 
The Court was prepared to hold that most of the works were transformative: when 
viewed side-by-side they manifested an entirely different aesthetic (“hectic and 
provocative” rather than “serene and deliberately composed”) and added something 
new. 167  They were of any entirely different scale, and used collage and other 
techniques to change the underlying images. This conclusion was reinforced by 
Prince’s intention: to create something “completely different … a kind of fantastic, 
absolutely hip, up to date, contemporary take on the music scene.”168 A decision of 
the remaining five artworks was never handed down as the case settled.169 
It is beyond the scope of this article to engage in a lengthy critique of this case, which 
has received a mixed reception in the US.170 Relevant for this article is the proposition 
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that Prince’s artworks, if they were the subject of similar litigation in the UK, could 
reasonably be classified as instances of pastiche under section 30A, given the artistic 
techniques employed. Because parodic or critical overtone is not required, it would 
not be fatal that Prince himself denied that he was “commenting on any aspects of 
culture” or “trying to create anything with a new meaning or a new message”, his goal 
simply being to “try to change [the original image] into something that’s completely 
different”, being “great art that makes people feel good.” 171  The analysis would 
instead focus on whether the works were fair dealings. Here a number of the 
traditional factors might be relevant, including the extent of copying, what new 
material or context has been added by the defendant, and whether the defendant’s 
purpose could have been achieved with a less intrusive amount of copying.172 One 
could also envisage a parallel complaint under the integrity right,173 for instance due 
to the level of nudity in Prince’s works, and – potentially – the re-use of images for 
purposes well outside the use for which subject consents were originally obtained.  
Comparing UK and US law, it might be argued that a pastiche exception helps avoid 
some of the difficulties in assessing whether a work is transformative for the purposes 
of the fair use doctrine.174 For instance, Amy Adler, who lauds the role of copying in 
contemporary creative enterprise and self-describes as “unapologetically Team 
Richard Prince”, 175  has said that the transformativeness inquiry in cases such as 
Cariou v Prince is predicated on assumptions that are antithetical to modern art (eg, 
that there is a stable meaning or message in a work), focuses on whether a work is 
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new when much art rejects newness as a goal, and uses inconsistent approaches to 
deciding aesthetic matters. Adler raises the possibility of using market impact as the 
primary tool to judge fair use in cases involving the visual arts, on the basis that the 
value of art derives not just from the expression but the artist’s imprimatur, meaning 
that new works can involve a high degree of copying without any market substitution 
taking place. 176  In the UK, the presence of pastiche may avoid some of these 
problems because this practice does not require a new message or meaning. This may 
permit judges applying section 30A to focus instead on fairness, which could 
conceivably include some of the market substitution points raised by Adler, given that 
competition between the works is an accepted component of fair dealing analysis.177 
The second example to illustrate this article’s conception of pastiche is Salinger v 
Colting, another decision of the Second Circuit. The case related to a novel written by 
the defendant, Fredrik Colting, under the pseudonym John David California, and 
titled 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye. The novel explored the relationship 
between JD Salinger and Holden Caulfield, the protagonist of The Catcher in the Rye. 
It utilised two narrators: 76 year old “Mr C”, who has experiences and recounts 
stories similar to those of Holden Caulfield in Catcher; and his 90 year old author, 
who interrupts the story at numerous points and who wishes to write Mr C out of 
existence. The two characters meet and reconcile at the end of the novel.  
In an application for a preliminary injunction restraining publication of the novel, the 
defendants sought to argue was that 60 Years was a parody that commented on 
Catcher and Salinger.178 However, Judge Batts rejected this argument, describing the 
defendants’ contentions as “post-hoc rationalizations employed through vague 
generalizations about the alleged naivete of the original, rather than reasonably 
perceivable parody.”179 In her view, themes and ideas in Catcher were repeated in 60 
Years, and there was nothing parodic about the new context, eg, the age of the 
characters and the changes to the world in the intervening years. Judge Batts 
observed: 
… 60 Years’ plain purpose is not to expose Holden Caulfield’s disconnectedness, 
absurdity, and ridiculousness, but rather to satisfy Holden’s fans’ passion for 
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Holden Caulfield’s disconnectedness, absurdity, and ridiculousness, which 
Catcher has “elevated into the realm of protectable creative expression.”180 
These findings were fortified by descriptions of the novel as a sequel to Catcher, for 
instance on the original jacket of the book and in other public statements.181 With the 
conclusions regarding the minimally transformative nature of 60 Years bolstered by 
other findings in relation to commerciality, the nature of the plaintiff’s work and the 
extent of copying, Judge Batts concluded that any fair use defence was unlikely to 
succeed, a point with which the appeal judges agreed.182 Critiquing this conclusion, 
Kate O’Neill argues that 60 Years is a “metafiction” (ie, “a fiction about a fiction”),183 
and that by construing it as a sequel, Judge Batts gave inadequate weight to the 
significance of the dual narrative structure. For instance, it could be argued that this 
structure was inherently transformative due to its effect on the reader’s perceptions of 
the original work, illuminating the frustration Salinger might have felt about his own 
fame and notoriety, the popularity of Holden Caulfield, and the continued calls 
(almost all of which were rejected) for sequels and dramatizations.184 
O’Neill makes a credible case that Judge Batts mischaracterised the defendant’s 
novel, with the result that the parody arguments never get off the ground. However, 
even if Judge Batts’ analysis was correct, one could imagine a convincing argument 
in the UK that the defendant’s novel was a pastiche, and indeed 60 Years has been 
described that way in the literature. 185  Such an approach would reduce the 
significance of the classification of fan fiction in the UK, because different forms – 
eg, a sequel that retains the events and vision of the underlying work versus a critical 
work that changes the focus and experience of the reader – could fall within a fair 
dealing purpose. It would also help remove the need for defendants to retrofit tortured 
and self-serving arguments about critical commentary as part of their fair dealing 
argumentation. Indeed, one of the refreshing aspects of Cariou v Prince was the 
defendant’s refusal to invoke some concocted highfalutin explanation of his works. If, 
                                                 
180 Ibid. 260, citing Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc v Carol Pub Group, Inc, 150 F 3d 132, 
143 (2nd circuit 1998). 
181 Ibid. 262. 
182 Salinger v Colting, 607 F 3d 68 (2nd circuit 2010). However, the injunction granted by 
Judge Batts was vacated and the case remanded on the basis that the standard for granting a 
preliminary injunction did not accord with that in eBay, Inc v MercExchange, LLC, 547 US 
388 (2006). The case settled before any new orders were made. 
183 Kate O’Neill, “The Content of Their Characters: J.D. Salinger, Holden Caulfield, Fredrik 
Colting” (2012) 59 J. Copyright Society USA 291, 296. 
184 Ibid. 307-316. 
185 See Bernard A Drew, Literary Afterlife: The Posthumous Continuations of 325 Authors’ 
Fictional Characters (McFarland & Company 2010) 90. 
Pastiche: Mashed-up drafting?   35 
in a UK context, we just accept those works are instances of pastiche, we can turn to 
the more important question: are they fair dealings? 
There is one final point to make about Salinger v Colting, which relates to compelled 
speech. In the course of discussing the standard for an injunction, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit observed that the “’loss of First Amendment 
freedoms,’ and hence infringement of the right not to speak, ‘for even minimal 
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” 186  Questions arise 
regarding the source of such a right: does it come from Colting seeking to, say, 
present 60 Years as authored or endorsed by Salinger, or merely from Salinger’s 
refusal to licence derivative works? O’Neill argues that the Court of Appeals 
“invoked this language to deflect attention from a factitious and circular argument 
that Colting’s work deprived Salinger of a valuable licensing right”, helping bolster “a 
weak link in his claim for infringement”.187 She also highlights the dangers of these 
ideas for fair use reasoning: 
This rhetoric is very powerful … and I hope that future courts will resist using it 
to support close judgments in hard cases. Unchecked, the rhetoric implies that 
Salinger’s copyright claim involves fundamental personal freedoms guaranteed 
to him by the Bill of Rights and not just a privilege limited by time and fair use. 
… With a few short words, the court managed to translate Salinger’s undoubted 
commercial right to license – and to refuse to license – into a private, 
constitutional privilege to censor derivative works during the copyright term, 
unchecked by the doctrine of fair use. I think copyright defendants need to 
challenge this rhetoric head on because, taken at face value, it eviscerates fair 
use.188 
Recall that one criticism of Deckmyn, above, related to its under-particularised 
analysis of discriminatory message, which raised the risk of compelled speech 
arguments effecting a significant carve-out from the scope of Art. 5(3)(k).189 If our 
concern is confusion – ie, that the public believes that the original author is speaking 
or has agreed to the speech – then parody may have an in-built protection because the 
comedic or satirical flavour will help indicate that the speaker is not the original 
author. Given that pastiche does not require any comment or twist, there is a risk that 
compelled speech may cut even more deeply if we do not think carefully about the 
harms we are seeking to prevent. As noted earlier, if our concern relates to the 
fraudulent presentation of the defendant’s works as having been created by the 
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claimant, there are causes of action to deal with this, and the defendant’s bad faith 
could be relevant to fairness. If, on the other hand, members of the public are merely 
unsure or mistaken about the work’s authorship, there are questions as to whether this 
should be afforded any weight as a compelled speech argument in a fair dealing 
analysis.  
One answer to the above may be that the compelled speech tenor of Deckmyn 
pertained to discriminatory messages, and that many instances of pastiche are neutral 
or laudatory, and do not involve content that might be inflammatory. The merits of 
this view will depend on its accuracy as an empirical claim and on the contours of the 
compelled speech argument, including whether it continues to be linked to Article 
21(1) of the Charter or develops as a free-standing speech argument that can be 
applied to other unpalatable content. As already noted, the Canal Zone series of 
Richard Prince contained a great deal of nudity, raising the question of whether 
obscenity could ground a compelled speech argument; and in Salinger, it is not clear 
that problematic content was even necessary for a “right not to speak” to be 
enlivened. In sum, we need to be careful about compelled speech, and its potential to 
effect a significant watering down of Article 5(3)(k).  
V. CONCLUSION  
This article has argued that the introduction of section 30A into the CDPA is far more 
significant than has been appreciated thus far due to the inclusion of pastiche as one 
of the three fair dealing purposes, thereby giving the UK a defence covering mash-
ups, fan fiction, music sampling, collage, appropriation art and other forms of homage 
and compilation. It has argued that as a matter of doctrine and policy, pastiche should 
be read broadly to include a range of uses, including imitation of the style of pre-
existing works, incorporation of elements or features of those works, and the 
production of compilations and medleys. To the extent this results in an overshoot in 
permitted conduct, this can be dealt with through the fair dealing machinery, which 
can effect the proportionality exercise countenanced in Deckmyn and deal with any 
additional requirements arising from Article 5(5). Such an approach may even offer 
advantages over the concept of transformative use in US law by short-circuiting the 
need for analysis of the critical commentary, message or newness of a work, and 
instead allowing judges to place the intellectual heavy lifting where it best belongs: in 
the assessment of fairness. 
